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Questioning Psychology’s Place
in the University Curriculum
by
Shannone B. Nelson
For a discipline to be worthy, it must display not only that it can
generate legitimate knowledge, but also that it can use that knowledge
in a beneficial, practical and valuable way. For well over one hundred
years now, psychology has sought to justify itself (to prove
itself as a science) on its contributions to “scientific” knowledge of
mind and behaviour. In trying so hard to be a science, psychology has
indeed provided a wealth of knowledge. Unfortunately, these copious
amounts of information fail to achieve the goal of making us more
knowledgeable. Some may argue that this is simply because psychology
should not be one of the natural sciences. This however is not the
fundamental question. The fundamental question is what has contributed
to this immense problem in our discipline and given this, is our
discipline worthy of staying within the university curriculum?
In the quest to be accepted as a natural science, psychology has
produced abundant scientific products through rigorous theory building,
experimental research and statistical-mathematical analysis at an
extremely fast rate (Sarason, 1981; Staats, 1983). The result of this
however is a deluge of knowledge that is unorganised; chaotic.
Consequently, the work produced remains inconsistent, competitive and
unrelated. The competitiveness and unrelated works of psychologists
from different specialties destroys the efficacy of research and
practice (Staats). Psychology is broken up into multiple categories of
knowledge (Clare, 1980; Sarason; Staats). This is in part due to the
way that students are trained within the university. Students have
little choice but to specialise very early in their graduate career
given that, with the exception of a few common courses like statistics,
they are compelled to concentrate on one area of knowledge to the
exclusion of others – particularly clinical psychology (Kennedy &
Innes, 2005; Staats). The importance of the conducting of experiments,
the obtaining of data, the construction of new equipment and
laboratories has been overemphasised – all without regard to the
implication for general theory.
Psychology as a science lacks integration of its diverse knowledge.
This is amplified by the fact that we lack the tools to turn our
disparate information into organised, consensually accepted knowledge
(Staats, 1983). The patchwork of diverse and competing theories in our
discipline is like a barricade, preventing us from advancing to an
organised knowledge distinctive of the advanced scientific disciplines.
Psychology’s success in producing arguably scientific findings has only
led to the problem of obtaining meaning in the flood of theory, fact
and method produced. We appear to be evading any theory that would give
us a general explanation. The diversity is such that it is impossible
for a psychologist to incorporate but a small portion of differing
specialties available in the way that these areas currently
represented. Staats described the problem elegantly, “The typical
psychologist cannot even get a feel for what his science is about,
because the materials in it are so diverse and disorganised” (p.12). He
further states that psychologists seem disinterested with establishing
unified theory, with special area psychologists reluctant to refer to
any sub theories or to other specialties as authority.
The competitive and unrelated work of psychologists from differing
specialties is not the only problem relating to theory and method in
our discipline. Theoreticians are products themselves of a
socialisation process, and through this process, they have formed a
particular view of individuals and of society. This view is unavoidably
embraced in psychological theories, which are illustrations of people
and their social order (Clare, 1980; Sarason, 1981; Pols, 2005; Szasz,
1960, 1974, 2000, 2003; Taylor, Peplau & Sears, 2003). Sarason
believes that a case can be made that through psychology’s constricted
focus and failure to recognise its manufacture from, place in, and
service to the social order, the discipline has adversely affected the
lives of many people. These theorists are a very distinctive group in
society, highly educated, mostly white, economically advantaged, and
trained and working in universities (Sarason). These factors quite
obviously cause bias in their theories and research from which we make
conclusions about people and their interactions with the world and each
other.
It is a regrettable fact while psychology has stringent scientific
methods to ensure the validity of findings, there is a crucial
imbalance in the types of validity we obtain. Internal validity
concerns the extent to which we may draw inferences about the affect of
one variable on another (Stanley, 1999; Murphy & Davidshofer,
2001). External validity on the other hand has to do with the extent to
which we can generalise our research results to the population or
context in which we are interested. Internal validity in psychological
research is strong, our rigorous methods assure this. However, there is
an uneven balance, with our research being heavy on internal but
lacking somewhat in external validity (Stanley). This is a consequence
of two primary reasons. First is that much of psychological research
conducted is American, with American subjects. This argument is harping
back to the previous argument regarding the socialisation of
psychologists and their social order theories. The second reason for
the imbalance in validity is the fact that the majority of research is
carried out using undergraduate psychology students as participants
(Sears, 1986; Stanley).
Psychological researchers conduct research and use their findings to
make inferences about the wider population. While America makes up less
than 5% of the world’s population, Americans are the largest producers
of this research and given this, Americans are the overwhelming subject
of this research (Stanley, 1999). From this very narrow sample, beliefs
and theories are developed that are thought to apply to all humans in
general. Another problem that narrows the field even further is that,
as previously mentioned, these researchers are a very distinctive group
within the American society. They are highly educated, predominantly
white, economically privileged and of course, trained and working in
universities. So their view of who make up society, who matters in
society, is largely based on their own socialised worldviews and they
conduct their research accordingly (Sarason, 1981). This may be
illustrated by the fact that research is overwhelmingly conducted using
undergraduate students as participants (Kazdin, 1999; Sears, 1986;
Stanley).
Psychological researchers have, in aiming to produce reliably
scientific findings, become more devoted to using laboratory
experimentation. In doing this, they have also inexorably become
increasingly committed to using undergraduate psychology students as
research subjects. Further to being enrolled in psychology courses,
Kazdin (1999) found that these participants usually receive course
credit or monetary rewards for their participation. It seems that
whatever the subject published, the publications of findings in
psychology are laboratory research on undergraduate psychology students
(Sears, 1986, Stanley, 1999). Sears found that close to 80% of studies
published in psychological journals used only undergraduate students,
in a laboratory setting, as opposed to only up to 15% using adults in
their natural environment. Further, he found that all of these factors
have resulted in a biased view of human beings reflective of the
thoughts, emotions and behaviours typical of undergraduate students.
This raises the question, are the conclusions drawn from research
conducted using such a narrow database flawed? It is hard to say but
surely many findings lack external validity due to this significant
problem of sampling.
As a science of knowledge and as an applied science, psychology has
failed to generate legitimate knowledge and further, it has failed to
use the knowledge it has in an organised, beneficial, practical and
valuable way.
Ms. Nelson is a student at the University
of Wollongong, Australia. To contact
her, remove the X from the
e-mail address.
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References
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